This paper examines market risk in four demutualised and self-listed stock exchanges: the Australian Stock Exchange, the Deutsche Börse, the London Stock Exchange and the Singapore Stock Exchange. Daily company and MSCI index returns provide the respective asset and market portfolio data. A bivariate MA-GARCH model is used to estimate time-varying betas for each exchange from listing until 7 June 2005. While the results indicate significant beta volatility, unit root tests show the betas to be mean-reverting. These findings are used to suggest that despite concerns that demutualised and self-listed exchanges entail new market risks that merit regulatory intervention, the betas of the exchange companies have not changed significantly since listing. 
Introduction
The ownership and governance structures of securities exchanges around the world have changed dramatically in the last decade or so. Starting with the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993, the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995 and the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 1996, the major theme has been the abandonment of the traditional mutual structure, where the exchange is owned by trade-executing brokers, in favour of a corporate form of ownership, where stock in the exchange may be owned by non-broker third-parties [see Appendix 1 for the breakdown of global exchanges by legal status]. At the same time, these structural changes have opened up opportunities for the merger of exchanges and related settlement systems, and the formation of joint ventures and alliances with other exchanges and settlement systems, both nationally and internationally. And concomitantly, the changes in ownership and governance have raised regulatory issues relating to the ability of a for-profit, often monopolistic, exchange to properly exercise its responsibilities regarding trading, settlement and the surveillance of market behaviour including, in an increasing number of instances, its own.
It is the latter, whether self-regulation is inconsistent with demutualization (read for-profit) and (often, though not always) self-listing (read non-intermediary owners), that has most dominated discussion of these global changes in ownership and governance. Certainly, it has been high on the agenda for securities regulators. Consider the Australian Stock Exchange.
While its demutualization and subsequent self-listing was not associated with a complete rewrite of market provisions, the amended legislation did include: (i) provisions that no person (or group of associated persons) should own more than five (now fifteen) percent of its share capital, (ii) a fuller articulation of the obligations of exchanges, especially for market monitoring and supervision, (iii) requirements for reports detailing compliance with supervisory obligations and powers to enforce compliance, and (iv) other powers directed to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) as listing authority and supervisor.
The exchange itself says as much: "As both a market operator and commercial entity, ASX works closely with oversight bodies to ensure the appropriate supervision of its own market and the management of any conflicts of interest that may arise with its for-profit activities.
This successful balance underpins the integrity of the market" (ASX 2005) . Similarly, in the Singapore Exchange the five business divisions are kept separate from the regulatory division.
On top of this, two additional safeguards are in place. One is in the form of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the exchange's regulator, which supervises the exchange's compliance with its listing rules. The other is in the form of a conflicts committee, set up to consider all possible conflicts of interest and to notify the regulator of all identified conflicts (SGX 2005) .
In general, the balance of opinion of both regulators and exchanges worldwide is that exchange demutualization (whether not-for-profit or for-profit), with and without self-listing, is no less consistent with the development and enforcement of appropriate listing and disclosure standards, surveillance and discipline, financial and operational compliance, and fair and equitable treatment of customers, than mutualisation (Steil 2002) . However, an additional concern that has received rather less attention is whether the act of demutualization and listing itself has facilitated risky business activities that may be of concern to regulators, which simply did not arise when the exchanges were mutual.
For example, as early as 2001 the IOSCO Technical Committee expressed concern that "…the profit-seeking actions of a demutualised exchange may provide further encouragement to enter businesses other than those directly ancillary to its traditional trade execution functions" (IOSCO 2001: 14) . This, it suggests, entails new financial risks for the exchange that may merit regulatory intervention, such as the imposition of "…firewalls to protect the resources necessary to run the exchange's core activities". From an Australian perspective, Segal (2001) likewise discusses how the self-listed Australian Stock Exchange's "…role as a market regulator and its role as a commercialised entity able to pursue business initiatives in many directions" opened up the scope for conflict early on, and the potential for new forms of risk through global links, including clearing and settlement arrangements.
Demutualization and self-listing patently appear to have played a major role in freeing-up the ability of exchanges to engage in many commercial activities -part of their stated purpose after all. For example, just a few months after demutualization the Australian Stock Exchange fifty member exchanges concluded that demutualised exchanges generated about twice as much service income from (less-traditional) market data dissemination as did mutuals, and much less from (more-traditional) transaction fees. Likewise, while all demutualised and listed exchanges in this survey identified themselves as being for-profit, more than one-third of member exchanges and less than one-half of association exchanges did not identify profits as a business goal (WFE 2003) .
Clearly, the financial risk of exchanges may have increased substantially relative to their (traditional) domestic market with the process of demutualization. This is especially likely to be the case for self-listed exchanges, where ownership is usually more dispersed (albeit with limitations on maximum holdings) than demutualised-only entities whose ownership is (sometimes) concentrated in the hands of prior mutual holders, domestic financial intermediaries, and even governments. Accordingly, this paper aims to ascertain the changes in risk in selected demutualised and self-listed stock exchanges and examine if this risk has increased substantially during the period since listing and the freeing-up of commercial behaviour. The measure of risk (beta) used is relative and domestic as this is thought likely to be of most relevance to national regulators. The paper itself is divided into four sections.
Section explains the data used in the analysis and presents some brief descriptive statistics.
Section 3 discusses the methodology employed. The results are dealt with in Section 4. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks. The raw data employed in the study are the daily prices of the four stock exchange companies and the daily market value-weighted equity indices for Australia (AUS), Germany (GER), the United Kingdom (UK) and Singapore ( where T is the sample size, then all estimates are once again statistically significant at any conventional level. Finally, the calculated Jarque-Bera statistics and corresponding p-values in Table 1 are used to test the null hypotheses that the daily distribution of exchange and market portfolio returns is normally distributed. All p-values are smaller than the .01 level of significance suggesting the null hypothesis can be rejected. None of these returns are then well approximated by the normal distribution.
Data and statistics

Methodology
The standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) includes asset betas (market risk) that are constant. But starting with Fabozzi and Francis (1978) the suggestion is made that beta coefficients may move randomly through time rather than remain constant. Bos and Newbold (1984) argue such variation may be due, in part, to the influence of microeconomic factors, including operational changes in the case of company betas. A large number of studies have subsequently estimated time-varying betas in a variety of contexts with several different methods, including Bollerslev et al. (1988) , Engle and Rodrigues (1989) , Hall et al. (1989) , Bodurtha and Mark (1991) , Ng (1991) , Lin et al. (1992) , Faff et al. (1992) , Koutmos et al. (1994 ) Wells, C. (1994 Giannopoulos, K. (1995) , Episcipos (1996) , Gonzalez-Rivera (1996) Brooks et al. (1998) , Tai, C.S. (2000) and Choudhry (2002; .
But before proceeding with the methodology used in this paper, a question arises as to what beta magnitudes may be reasonably expected for the four exchanges. To start with, in the absence of any information regarding the systematic risk of the firm, the best estimate of the equity beta of any stock is unity. However, this is an infinitely more reasonable assumption for the exchanges in question. This is because, for the most part, exchange operations are focused on areas that are likely to be highly related to overall market activity and performance. For example, the principal sources of revenue for most exchanges are listings, trading, clearing and settlement and the provision of market data. Of course, equity betas depend on both the operations of the company and its capital structure, and companies in the same industry with similar operations may have different equity betas if their capital structures differ. Accordingly, while it is not the objective of the current study, an asset beta for the exchanges could be obtained by unlevering the equity betas.
A bivariate GARCH (BEKK) model is developed to examine the joint processes relating the daily returns of the asset (the exchange) and the market portfolio. Bollerslev et al. (1988) , Engle and Rodrigues (1989) , Hall et al. (1989) , Ng (1991) , Koutmos et al. (1994) , Giannopoulos (1995) and Choudhry (2002; apply some form of multivariate GARCH models to estimate time-varying betas and Bollerslev et al. (1992) , Bera and Higgins (1993) and Engle and Kroner (1995) provide detailed analysis of these models more generally. The following conditional mean return equation accommodates the returns for the exchange (i = 1) and the market portfolio (i = 2) and follows a moving average (MA) process represented as:
where r it = (r 1t , r 2t )' is a 2×1 vector of returns from the exchange and the market portfolio; the 2×1 vector of random errors, ε it, is the innovation for each return at time t with its corresponding 2×2 conditional variance-covariance matrix, H t ; the market information available at time t-1 is represented by the information set I t-1 such that (Karolyi 1995) . The model also ensures the condition of a positive semi-definite conditional variance-covariance matrix in the optimisation process, and is a necessary condition for the estimated variances to be zero or positive. The BEKK parameterisation for the bivariate GARCH(1,1) model is written as: 
where T is the number of observations, n is the number of markets, θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and all other variables are as previously defined. The BHHH (Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman) algorithm is used to produce the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and their corresponding asymptotic standard errors.
The time varying beta (β) for asset (1) is the estimated conditional variance of the market portfolio from the bivariate GARCH model. As the conditional variance and conditional covariance are time dependent, then the stock exchange beta will also be time dependent.
Lastly, the Ljung-Box Q statistic is used to test for independence of higher relationships as manifested in volatility clustering by the GARCH model (Huang and Yang 2000: 329) . This statistic is given by:
where r(j) is the sample autocorrelation at lag j calculated from the noise terms and T is the number of observations. Q is asymptotically distributed as χ 2 with (p -k) degrees of freedom and k is the number of explanatory variables. This test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the model is free of serial correlation and independent of higher order ARCH processes.
Empirical results
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the conditional mean return equations are presented in Table 2 . All estimations are made using the S-PLUS ® statistical software with the GARCH add-on module. Four separate equations are specified, one for each exchange and market combination. The long-term drift (µ 1 ) coefficients in all four exchanges are positive and significant. These long-term drift components represent the daily non-stochastic trend and on this basis, the ASX (0.1149) has the largest daily trend, followed by LSE (0.1029), DEB (0.1027) and SGX (0.0681). The daily non-stochastic trend in the market portfolios is also highest in Australia, then the United Kingdom, Singapore and Germany: AUS (0. line is also included in each graph, with a small downward trend for the ASX betas, and small upward trends for the DEB, LSE and SGX betas. Table 5 includes the mean and variance of these exchange beta estimates. As shown, the ASX has the highest beta (0.9527), followed by the SGX (0.7802), then the LSE (0.6589) and finally the DEB (0.5692). Remembering the MSCI are equity indices, the range of betas is not difficult to account for. For instance, the business operations of the ASX are still aligned with the domestic equity market in much the same manner as its mutualised form. DEB, however, has much more diversified operations:
Deutsche Börse has a broader basis than all its competitors: its products and services portfolio covers the entire process chain: from securities and derivatives trading through the settlement of transactions and provision of market information right up to the development and operation of electronic trading systems" (DEB 2005) . There is also clearly much variation in these time-varying betas, with the ASX being the most variable, then LSE, DEB and SGX.
<FIGURE 2 HERE> p-values and the KPSS LM-statistic and asymptotic significance. In the case of the former the null hypothesis of a unit root is tested against the alternative of no unit root (stationary). For the latter, the null hypothesis of no unit root is tested against the alternative of a unit root (nonstationary). The unit root tests in Table 5 
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper uses a bivariate MA-GARCH to estimate the time-varying betas for four demutualised and self-listed stock exchanges: the Australian Stock Exchange, the Deutsche Börse, the London Stock Exchange and the Singapore Stock Exchange. Unit roots tests show that despite significant variability in each exchange's beta over time, they are covariance stationary and mean reverting. This has obvious and well-known for implications the capital asset pricing model, efficient markets hypothesis, event studies, and more importantly, the forecasting of exchange returns.
However, the primary focus of this analysis is instead on whether significant changes in market risk have arisen in securities exchanges through the process of demutualization and self-listing. While none of the exchanges has been listed for more than seven years, there is still ample evidence that the betas for these exchanges are stationary and have neither trended up nor down since listing. This suggests that despite ample evidence of operational and financial change since demutualization, and concerns that risky business decisions could impact upon the ability of exchanges to perform their traditional monitoring and supervisory role, there has been no significant change in financial risk.
Clearly, there is still much unknown concerning demutualised and self-listed securities exchanges and their impacts. Empirical research, for example, could follow the theoretical models of Hart and Moore (1996) and Pirrong (2000) and attempt to account for the ongoing demutualization movement. While the former has been criticised for over-emphasising the role of member heterogeneity and the apparent trade-off between exchange costs and profits, as against the role of internationalisation and corporatisation of membership and market competition, and the latter because he fails to take account of the choice of demutualised exchanges to take an additional step of widening their ownership by self-listing (Steil 1996; , they provide a convenient starting point. Another line of work could examine the relative performance (as variously defined) of demutualised exchanges, in reference to both their own mutual form and current mutuals. The same work could examine differences, if any, between the roughly equal number of demutualised but not listed exchanges and listed exchanges. Finally, there is scope for work to merely assay the current situation regarding ownership and governance structures in securities exchanges. 
